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Abstract
Economic globalization causes an increasing international fragmentation
(disintegration) of value-added-chains, whereby ﬁrms outsource components
of production to foreign markets. There is a high level of concern about
unwelcome distributional eﬀects. This paper provides a theoretical treat-
ment of this issue within a general Heckscher-Ohlin framework, allowing
for an arbitrary number of goods, factors, and fragments. It shows how
a fragmented production equilibrium is disturbed by lower costs of frag-
mentation, and it introduces the concept of eﬀective prices of fragments
to derive general results that characterize the distributional consequences
of an increase in international fragmentation occurring simultaneously in
several industries.
JEL Code: D33, F11, F15, F23
Address: Altenberger Strasse 69, A-4040 LINZ-AUHOF
Phone: 0043-732-2468-8239, FAX: — 8238, E-mail: wilhelm.kohler@jku.at
Web: http://www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/members/kohler
(#): This work has been conducted under a research grant by the Austrian Science
Fund: "Public Finance, Unemployment and Growth", grant no. P14702.
It builds on my EPRU Woking Paper 2001-03 entitled “International Fragmentation
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Industrial production is a multi-stage process. Some stages are carried out in an
integrated way within ﬁrms, while others are outsourced to the market. In a market
economy, the borderline between vertical integration and outsourcing is determined by
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms who weigh the costs and beneﬁts of governing production in
an integrated, as opposed to disintegrated, way. This borderline is subject to change
if the conditions that determine these costs and beneﬁts change. Such changes are
most likely to meet the public eye, and cause policy concern, if domestic ﬁrms are
outsourcing parts of their value-added-chain to foreign economies and if the driving
force is lower cost due to factor price diﬀerences, say cheaper foreign labor. We have
seen several prominent examples of this happening in recent times, and a large body of
systematic empirical research has documented that such international outsourcing is a
signiﬁcant and distinctive feature of the present wave of economic globalization. The
international economy seems to have been undergoing a fundamental change, whereby
production of individual goods is increasingly disintegrated, or fragmented, between
countries with vastly diﬀerent economic conditions.1
Sometimes, particularly in empirical research, international outsourcing is identiﬁed
with trade in intermediates. In my view, however, the phenomenon of interest is not so
much trade in intermediate goods as such, which is by no means new, although perhaps
increasing in importance. International fragmentation involves a more fundamental
process which questions the notion of a clear and watertight distinction between value-
added and intermediate goods at each stage of production. The process is perhaps best
described as one where the principle of international arbitrage cuts into ever smaller
slices of what were so far perceived as coherent elements of the value-added-chain.
This is bound to aggravate the sense of vulnerability through open markets that often
characterizes policy attitudes towards economic globalization.
From a theoretical perspective, international fragmentation involves two distinct
challenges.2 O n ei st oa n a l y z et h ef o r c e sa tw o r kw h e nﬁrms decide whether to disin-
1An early characterization of this change can be found in Jones & Kierzkowski (1990) who have
pointed out that technological advances in certain types of services that are required to link diﬀerent
stages of production are an important driving element. For similar, more recent accounts, see Harris
(1995,2001), and Jones & Kierzkowski (2001a). For empirical studies, see Irwin (1996), Feenstra
(1998), Hummels et al. (1998, 2001), and several papers in Arndt & Kierzkowski (eds., 2001).
2Throughout this paper, I use the terms international outsourcing, international fragmentation,
1tegrate production. This leads right into the theory of the ﬁrm, which tries to explain
why in some cases production takes place in a vertically integrated way, relying on
intra-ﬁrm hierarchies, while in others it relies on market transactions. Basically, the
relevant decision problem has two dimensions: one is whether to disintegrate at all,
and the other is whether or not to do so across national borders. Thus, Grossman &
Helpman (2002a) develop a general equilibrium model focusing on the costs and bene-
ﬁts of outsourcing in a closed economy environment, while in Grossman and Helpman
(2002b) outsourcing as such is an exogenous necessity and the question is whether it
will be done across national borders.3 At any point in time, the relevant conditions
may change in such a way that there is a tendency of increasing integration on the ﬁrm
level, with a simultaneous tendency of international disintegration. The result then
is an emergence of vertical multinational ﬁrms, as for instance described in Markusen
(2001 and 2002).
The second challenge is to explore the general equilibrium consequences of such an
increase in international fragmentation if, for whatever reason, it occurs. As noted by
Jones & Kierzkowski (1990 and 2001a), one might generally expect that international
fragmentation increases the scope for gains from trade.4 B u tw ek n o wt h a ts u c hg a i n s
rarely come without pains, particularly in the form of unwelcome distributional eﬀects.
It is thus not surprising that in the second half of the 1990s outsourcing was taken
up on a somewhat less optimistic tone. Speciﬁcally, starting with Krugman (1995),
outsourcing has been debated as a possible culprit in connection with the concern that
has meanwhile arisen about the distributional consequences of economic globalization.
In principle, the second challenge is not independent from the ﬁrst, since the con-
sequences of outsourcing will presumably be an important ingredient in explaining the
extent to which it happens. However, models attempting to describe the forces be-
hind international fragmentation will often be quite stylized in precisely those aspects
relevant for income distribution. For instance, Grossman & Helpman (2002b), while
employing a general equilibrium model, assume a single factor (labor) which rules out
distributional issues. Conversely, models highlighting distributional consequences are
typically quite stylized when it comes to the driving forces of outsourcing. This is true
also for the present paper. In order to sharpen the focus on distributional eﬀects of
and international disintegration synonymously.
3See also McLaren (2000).
4See also a related recent paper by Samuelson (2001).
2an increase in international fragmentation, the cause of this increase is modeled in an
easy, and relatively rudimentary, way.5
Previous analyses have produced a vast array of diﬀerent results that sometimes
seem contradictory and are in general diﬃcult to understand as manifestations of a
single principle. In their seminal papers, Feenstra & Hanson (1996 and 1997) argue,
both theoretically and empirically, that outsourcing in connection with US-foreign di-
rect investment in Mexican Maquiladoras explains why wages for unskilled labor have
declined relative to skilled labor in both countries, while at the same time production
has become more skill-intensive. Arndt (1997 and 1999) argues that under certain con-
ditions US labor will gain from Maquiladora-type outsourcing to Mexico. He employs a
2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin-type model with labor and capital, but his argument may easily
be re-framed using skilled and unskilled labor instead, in which case his result is in stark
contrast to that of Feenstra and Hanson.6 Venables (1999) demonstrates that even in a
single two-sector model several diﬀerent outcomes may arise, including “some curious
cases”. Using a somewhat more general framework, Jones & Kierzkowski (2001a and
2001b) discuss a host of diﬀerent outcomes — “some rather surprising” — where fragmen-
tation may be beneﬁcial or harmful to low-skilled workers in relation to skilled workers
or capital, depending on a complex interplay between the factor endowment position
and output pattern of a country on the one hand, and the details of the fragmented
activities on the other. The richness of possible results is further demonstrated in the
work of Deardorﬀ (2001a and 2001b) who focuses on international factor price equal-
ization, rather than domestic income distribution. In Deardorﬀ (2001a), he shows that
fragmentation increases the likelihood of international factor price equalization in that
it renders factor price equalization an equilibrium outcome for certain factor endow-
ments which would otherwise rule this out. However, in Deardorﬀ (2001b) he warns
against reading too much into this result, pointing out that under certain conditions
fragmentation may actually increase international factor price diﬀerences.
5While some trade-oﬀ of this kind is unavoidable, it is often important for models focusing on
the welfare and distributional consequences to specify what type of cost is involved. For instance, in
Kohler (2001) I show that it matters a lot for welfare consequences whether or not there is a ﬁxed
cost of outsourcing. In this paper, I assume that there is no ﬁxed cost element involved.
6In Kohler (2001), I have shown that this diﬀerence is best understood in terms of the diﬀerence
between factor-biased technological change and sector-biased technological change, in connection with
the question of whether technological change happens in a closed or in an open economy; see also
Krugman (1995).
3In some sense, it is not surprising that a phenomenon as generic as fragmentation
should be associated with a variety of diﬀerent possible factor price changes. But at the
same time, it is surely not true that anything can happen. While the casuistic discussion
of the existing literature does shed light on the issue, we are still missing is a concise
formulation of a general principle which is at force in each special case. This paper
suggests a general equilibrium framework of analysis which allows us to formulate such
a principle. The framework addresses the distributional consequences of international
f r a g m e n t a t i o ni naw o r l dw h e r et r a d ei sd e t e r m i n e db yac o e x i s t e n c eo fR i c a r d i a na n d
Heckscher-Ohlin-type comparative advantage. An important element of the analysis is
that it allows for an arbitrary number of goods, factors and value-added components
(fragments). It assumes that outsourcing takes place from a domestic economy to a
neighboring country both of which face given world prices for ﬁnal goods. Factor price
diﬀerences between these countries form the key incentive to carry out international
fragmentation. The analysis assumes a constant returns to scale technology and perfect
competition.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an informal account of the
analysis and its core results. Section 3 introduces a formal description of a technology
that allows for fragmentation of production. It then describes a trading equilibrium,
ﬁrst for the case where production in each industry is vertically integrated within the
d o m e s t i ce c o n o m y ,a n dt h e nf o rac a s ew h e r ev a l u e - a d d e di ne a c hi n d u s t r yi sf r a g m e n t e d
across national borders. This involves the deﬁnition of eﬀective prices for fragments
of value-added, and it gives rise to the notion of a “margin of international disintegra-
tion”. Section 4 shows that a shift in this “margin” involves a Stolper-Samuelson-type
disturbance, and it explains the magnitude of this disturbance in terms of relevant in-
dustry characteristics. Section 5 then allows such disturbances to arise simultaneously
in several industries, exploring the general equilibrium implications for factor prices.
It identiﬁes conditions under which some factors will necessarily lose from outsourc-
ing, and it derives a key proposition describing how the distributional consequences
from international fragmentation depend on the industry-pattern of outsourcing. This
proposition is then used to reconstruct special cases that have been discussed in the
previous literature. Section 6 concludes the paper with suggestions for further research.
2 An informal account
In trade theory, a deﬁning element of a production process is that it is carried out under
a single set of factor prices, domestic or foreign. The distinctive feature of international,
4as opposed to domestic, outsourcing is that it allows production of a single good, or
a single value-added-process, to draw on diﬀerent factor markets with diﬀering factor
prices. Domestic outsourcing is, almost by deﬁnition, outsourcing to a market with
the same factor prices. In contrast, international outsourcing, as deﬁned in this paper,
responds to factor price diﬀerences in trying to achieve cost-savings through a suitable
match between the production characteristics of individual fragments of value-added
and the pattern of factor prices prevailing in foreign countries. If technology permits
production to be fragmented, then un-exploited cost-savings of this kind, duly taking
into account all costs of disintegrating production cross-borders, are inconsistent with
equilibrium. And any existing equilibrium will be disturbed if such opportunities arise
due to lower costs of disintegrated production.
As long as production is integrated within ﬁrms, individual fragments (or com-
ponents) of the value-added process do not carry market prices.7 However, one may
impute a value to any one fragment of such a process which is equal to the market price
of the ﬁnal good less the cost incurred for all other components, as required per unit
of the ﬁnal good. In reference to the eﬀective protection literature we may call this the
“eﬀective price” of a fragment; see Ethier (1977). The equilibrium condition of zero
proﬁts implies that the opportunity cost of the resources used to produce any frag-
ment are equal to its eﬀective price. Conversely, if the opportunity cost of procuring a
value-added-fragment from foreign factor markets falls below its present eﬀective price,
say because of lower costs of fragmented (as opposed to integrated) production, then
the equilibrium is disturbed by an incentive to pursue international fragmentation, or
outsourcing. By lowering the cost of the fragments that are outsourced to foreign factor
markets, such international fragmentation raises the eﬀective price of those fragments
which remain in the domestic value-added-chain. This is the general principle behind
all results obtained in this paper. The approach contrasts with the previous literature
in that it maps international outsourcing into equivalent price changes, rather than
equivalent technology changes; see Feenstra & Hanson (1999).
If production allows for fragmentation, then the aggregate factor bundle used for
certain good can be thought of as a composite of several factor bundles representing
individual fragments. International fragmentation means that ﬁrms draw on foreign
factor markets for some of these fragments. The ﬁrst result (Theorem 1) is a character-
ization of an equilibrium fragmented production pattern by means of a hyperplane in
7Throughout the analysis, I use the terms fragment and component synonymously.
5factor space which separates fragments that are outsourced to the foreign country from
those produced domestically. The position of this plane is determined by Ricardian
diﬀerences in technology, by factor price diﬀerences prevailing between the two coun-
tries, and of course by the costs of international fragmentation. In general equilibrium,
there is one such hyperplane for each ﬁnal good produced. I will call these hyper-
planes “margins of disintegration”. For analytical purposes, scenarios of globalization
that involve technological advances as well as reductions in trading and communication
costs can usefully be described as changing the position of these hyperplanes, causing
a disturbance of the initial equilibrium, and a subsequent adjustment whereby an in-
creasing number of fragments change their location of production and, perhaps more
importantly, which involves a change in domestic factor prices.
The second result of the paper (Theorem 2) l o o k sm o r ec l o s e l ya tt h ed i s t u r b a n c e
of the zero proﬁt condition that emerges in any one industry if some globalization
scenario displaces its margin of disintegration. It determines the magnitude of this
disturbance from the speciﬁc characteristics of the marginal fragment aﬀected by this
shift, in conjunction with the Ricardian technology gaps and the factor-price diﬀer-
ences prevailing in the initial equilibrium. Intuitively, the cost-savings achieved from
outsourcing a particular fragment of value-added in a certain industry constitute a gain
that “mandates” paying higher rewards to the factors that contribute to the residual
domestic fragments of that industry’s value-added-chain. Theorem 3 identiﬁes condi-
tions under which this industry-gain may be seen as a Stolper-Samuelson disturbance
in the sense of an equivalent increase in the eﬀective price of that particular industry’s
residual domestic product.
The factor price eﬀect following from such a disturbance cannot be determined by
looking at one industry in isolation. Diﬀerent industries typically draw on common
pools of primary factors, hence factor price eﬀects can only be determined by a full
general equilibrium analysis. This requires broadening the perspective to all industries
and including factor market equilibrium, in addition to the zero-proﬁt equilibrium
conditions. Intuitively, the diﬀerent factors will not beneﬁt proportionally from the
above mentioned industry-gain. Indeed, as shown in Theorem 4, although in the case
considered in this paper the country as a whole always gains from outsourcing, under
certain conditions at least one factor must suﬀer a real income loss. However, this is
an extreme case of an income distribution eﬀect of international fragmentation, and
the result is of little help as it does not tell us which factor loses. Theorem 5 therefore
introduces a measure for distributional eﬀects which is more appropriate for the present
case, and it shows that the distributional consequences of international fragmentation
6are not at all determined by the factor-intensity pattern of those fragments which
are outsourced to the foreign economy. Instead, they are determined by the factor
intensity of the activities that remain economically viable in the domestic economy
and which have increased in value according to Theorem 3. Which of the activities
remains viable domestically is, in turn, determined by the intersectoral pattern of the
Stolper-Samuelson disturbances that arise in the process of outsourcing.
If Theorem 5 is the general principle called for in the introduction above, then it
should be possible to reconstruct various cases discussed in the existing literature as
special instances arising under speciﬁc conditions. This can, indeed, be done as shown
by two Corollaries to Theorem 5.
3 Equilibrium under fragmentation
3.1 Technology
Suppose there are I traded goods, produced with M primary factors according to a
constant returns to scale technology. Assuming that there is perfect competition on
domestic factor markets, we may describe the technology by means of concave unit-cost
functions ci(w), where w is a vector of domestic factor prices. Fragmentation implies
some form of separability in production functions, which must be reﬂe c t e di nt h eu n i t -
cost functions. I model this in a relatively easy and straightforward manner, such that












I thus assume a given number of fragments (components) which, for simplicity, is equal
to F for all goods. Each component has an associated minimum unit-cost function
c
f
i (w). This suggests that fragments have “natural” units. We shall return to this
question below. Notice that this is quite a strong form of separability, implying that the
unit factor demands for each fragment depends only on factor prices at its location of
production, and is independent on how, and where, other fragments are produced. This
is obviously important in the context of outsourcing. Moreover, the above technology
assumes that all fragments are essential. Using ∇ci(w) to denote the gradient of the
unit-cost function, the vector of cost-minimizing input requirements per unit-value of




























i(w)+ ... + a
F
i (w), (2)
where pi is the price of ﬁnal good i which we assume to be given and constant through-
out the analysis. Thus, a
f
i (w) denotes the cost-minimizing input bundle used in frag-
ment f of the value-added-chain per unit-value of the ﬁnal good i.
The foreign economy has the same technology, except for Ricardian diﬀerences in
productivity. Both countries face the same commodity prices, but they have diﬀerent
factor prices, due to factor endowment diﬀerences and/or trade barriers. We need not
model this in detail. If w∗ denotes foreign factor prices, the cost-minimizing input





















If τi > 1, then the foreign country has a Ricardian productivity disadvantage in in-
dustry i, and vice versa. I assume that such diﬀerences are industry-speciﬁc, but not
speciﬁc to individual fragments.
It is important to note that a∗
i(w∗) and a
f∗
i (w∗) are cost-minimal inputs assuming




i (w∗) with factor prices w. With international fragmentation, however,
part of production takes place under factor prices w, while the rest takes place with
prices w∗.W r i t i n g ˜ a
f







i ,w h e r eq
f
i measures the level of fragment f employed in industry i value-
added which will depend on the relative unit-cost of fragment f, and thus also on
factor prices w. If technology on the (upper) level of fragments is of the Leontief-type,
then q
f
i is a constant (for a given price pi).
3.2 Equilibrium with integrated production
As a point of reference, I ﬁrst characterize an international equilibrium where all pro-
d u c t i o ni si n t e g r a t e dw i t h i ne a c hc o u n t r y . Az e r op r o ﬁt equilibrium satisﬁes the fol-













8In both expressions, the ﬁrst inequality simply states that the minimum cost of pro-
ducing a unit-value of output must not be less than 1 in either country, given its factor
prices. For goods produced domestically, the equality must obtain. The second inequal-
ity follows from cost-minimization. a∗
i(w∗) is what cost minimizing foreign ﬁrms would
do to generate a unit-value of output, when faced with factor prices w∗.G i v e n t h e
assumed Hicks-neutral diﬀerence in technology, the bundle a∗
i(w∗) /τi is a feasible way
for domestic ﬁrms to generate a unit-value of output. Cost-minimization, therefore,
implies the second inequality in 5. The interpretation of 6 is analogous.
We make no special assumption about the pattern of specialization. If there is a
subset of goods S which are produced domestically but not produced abroad, and a
subset S∗ which is only produced by the foreign economy, then we must have8
(w − w
∗τi)






∗) < 0 i ∈ S
∗. (8)
Figure 1 illustrates an equilibrium for the case for two factors, K and L, and 4
goods, labeled 1 through 4. The line labeled w∗τ2 connects factor bundles satisfying
τ2 (w∗
KK + w∗
LL)=1 , while the line w depicts (wKK + wLL)=1 . By construction,
τ2 > 1, i.e., the foreign economy has a Ricardian disadvantage in good 2. The position
of line w∗τ2,r e l a t i v et ow,c a p t u r e st h i sd i s a d v a n t a g e ,a n ds i n c et h el i n ei se n t i r e l y
below the unit-value isoquant for good 2 (labeled 1/p2), while w is tangent to the
isoquant, good 2 is only produced domestically. Analogous interpretations hold for
all 4 goods. Figure 1 thus depicts a case where good 1 is not produced domestically,
while goods 2 and 3 are not produced abroad and good 3 is produced in common. To
avoid clutter, only factor bundles a2(w) and a∗
4(w∗) are depicted. Notice that, because
of the Ricardian diﬀerence in technology, this pattern does not uniquely reﬂect the
factor intensity ordering.9 For the same reason, we have non-equalized factor prices in
overlapping cones of diversiﬁcation.
3.3 Equilibrium with disintegrated production
The above equilibrium conditions are in terms of integrated technologies, assuming that
there is no international fragmentation. Using the notion of eﬀective prices, a similar
8All of these goods are, of course also produced in the rest of the world economy which we need
not look at for our purpose.
9Technological diﬀerences here act much like tariﬀs on intermediates in Deardorﬀ (1979).
9characterization of the equilibrium can now be obtained with respect to individual
fragments, allowing for international fragmentation, i.e., disintegration of production.
Id e ﬁne the eﬀective price of fragments.
Deﬁnition 1 (eﬀective price) For a zero-proﬁt equilibrium where all production is









i(w), with g,f =1...F. (9)
I nt h em o r eg e n e r a lc a s e ,w h e r es o m ef r a g m e n tg is already produced abroad, the term
wTa
g





The eﬀective price π
f
i is nothing but what is left over from a unit of revenue from
ﬁnal good i, after paying the minimum cost of securing all other fragments, given the
factor prices prevailing at their respective locations of production. Notice that the
deﬁnition relates to a speciﬁc equilibrium with associated input levels q
f
i for individual











an imputed market value for a unit of fragment f in industry i,o rap r i c e“ m a n d a t e d ”
by the factor cost of securing all other fragments required quantities.10 Without loss of
generality, we scale fragments such that in the initial equilibrium q
f
i =1for all f and
i.E ﬀective prices as deﬁned above are functions of both ﬁnal commodity prices and
factor prices, including foreign factor prices if production is disintegrated to start with.
However, since we assume given commodity prices, we shall henceforth only emphasize
dependence on factor prices.11
We can now re-frame the zero-proﬁt conditions in terms of eﬀective prices. Speciﬁ-








i (w),f =1 ...F (10)
which states that the minimum cost of fragment f must be equal to its imputed eﬀective
price if produced domestically, or else exceed this price whence it will be outsourced;
see below. There are F inequalities of this kind, each of which —t o g e t h e rw i t ht h e
10Compare Leamer’s (1998) notion of factor price changes “mandated” by goods price changes and
technology changes.
11Compare the deﬁnition of eﬀective prices in the theory of eﬀective protection; see Ethier (1977).
10corresponding deﬁnition 9 — is an equivalent expression of the fundamental zero proﬁt
equilibrium condition, i.e., equivalent to the ﬁrst inequality in 5.
T h ec a s eo fdisintegrated production i sc o m p l i c a t e db yt h ef a c tt h a tp r o d u c t i o n
takes place under two sets of factor prices, w and w∗. However, the above mentioned
assumption of separability in production makes things tractable. We only need to
observe the distinction between input bundles per unit of a fragment, ˜ a
f
i , and input
bundles used per unit-value of the ﬁnal good, a
f







i ,w h e r eq
f
i in general depends on both domestic and foreign
factor prices; see above. Barring international fragmentation, q
f
i is a function only of
domestic factor prices, but with disintegrated production it becomes a function also of
foreign factor prices. Although we have scaled fragments in such a way that the initial
equilibrium features q
f
i =1throughout, it is still important to observe the conceptual
diﬀerence between a
f
i (w) and ˜ a
f
i (w).
In order to characterize an equilibrium with disintegrated production, we use our
deﬁnition of eﬀective prices, to envisage a unit-value level of fragment f in industry i











These are simply scaled-up versions of the factor bundles ˜ a
f
i (w),s u c ht h a tb
f
i (w) rep-
r e s e n t sav a l u eo fo n e ,g i v e nπ
f













which is the unit-value level of foreign production of fragment f, assuming that it,
together with all other components, feeds into domestic assembly of the ﬁnal good i,
(hence the use of the domestic eﬀective price on the right-hand side of 12). Notice the
that 12 uses ˜ a
f∗
i (w), rather than a
f∗
i (w).I tt h u sd e n o t e st h ef a c t o rb u n d l ee m p l o y e db y
cost-minimizing ﬁrms in order to produce fragment f in the amount actually employed
per unit-value of good i in the initial equilibrium which we now assume to feature
disintegrated production, with some fragments produced under w and others under
w∗.I n c o n t r a s t , a
f∗
i (w) is the factor bundle used for that fragment if all production
t o o kp l a c ei na ni n t e g r a t e dw a yu n d e rf a c t o rp r i c e sw∗. Notice, once again, our deﬁ-
nition of units implying that q
f
i =1 , given factor prices w and w∗and the associated
pattern of international fragmentation. We now proceed to characterize this pattern
of fragmentation.




i (w) ≥ 1. (13)
11for all i and f. In equilibrium, domestic minimum cost of a unit-value level of fragment
f in industry i cannot be less than one, and it must be equal to one if this fragment is










This is similar to, yet also diﬀerent from condition 5 above. As expected, the possibility
to disintegrate production makes a diﬀerence. Figure 2 illustrates this by isolating
good 3 from the earlier ﬁgure. Barring international fragmentation, the case depicted
would be an equilibrium, where integrated production of good 3 is viable (non-viable)
domestically (abroad). Formally, for i =3condition 7 is satisﬁed, while 8 is not. But
if disintegration becomes possible, this is no longer an equilibrium. More speciﬁcally,





for f =1and i =3 . This is analogous to 6, and it states that in equilibrium foreign
production of fragment f with domestic assembly of the ﬁnal good must not yield
a positive proﬁt. If this condition is violated for any fragment f,t h e ni n t e g r a t e d
production cannot be an equilibrium, and international fragmentation must prevail.
It is perhaps more intuitive to look at the domestic equilibrium conditions under
fragmentation from a cost-savings perspective. Then, violation of condition 15 simply
means that domestic ﬁrms can reduce the cost of generating a unit-value below one by
outsourcing fragment f to foreign production.
3.4 The margin of disintegration
This is a natural stage to introduce costs of international fragmentation. Jones &
Kierzkowski (1990 and 2001a) emphasize that such costs are a crucial element behind
the recent upsurge of outsourcing. The speciﬁcf o r mi nw h i c ht h e ya r i s ep l a y sa n
important role in various circumstances; see Harris (2001) and Kohler (2001). For the
present purpose, I employ a simple ice-berg-type speciﬁcation. Thus, if home ﬁrms
produce fragment f of good i in the foreign country and then combine it with the
domestic chain of value-added, they incur trading and communication cost in the ad-
valorem amount of γi −1 > 0.12 As with the Ricardian technology gaps, I assume that
12The term aj may in part also represent formal trade barriers like tariﬀs, but we shall henceforth
assume that it represents real trading costs.
12these costs are uniform across fragments within an industry.
Generally, one expects that the diﬀerence in factor prices, as well as productivity
diﬀerences and the costs of disintegration determine the extent to which international
fragmentation takes place. This is substantiated in precise terms by the following
theorem:
Theorem 1 (margin of disintegration) In an equilibrium where production may be
disintegrated, (w−γiτiw∗)Ta =0deﬁnes a hyperplane in factor space which represents
a margin of disintegration (fragmentation) for industry i in the following sense:
1. Any fragment g with a factor input bundle b
g∗
i (w∗) that satisﬁes (w−γiτiw∗)Tb
g∗
i (w∗) <
0 is an integral part of the domestic value-added.
2. For any fragment h which is disintegrated from the domestic value-added chain
in industry i, the factor input bundle bh
i (w) must satisfy (w−γiτiw∗)Tbh
i (w) > 0.
The proof is straightforward. Equilibrium requires that domestic ﬁrms cannot further
reduce unit-cost by changing the location where individual fragments are produced.











Taking statement 2 ﬁrst, suppose some fragment h were produced domestically, while
sh
i > 0. This would imply that ﬁrms forego cost-savings even at unchanged levels
of fragments qh
i =1 . If technology allows for substitution between fragments, these
savings could even be increased by employing more of fragment h once produced at
lower cost abroad. Conversely, suppose that s
g
i < 0 and fragment g were outsourced.
Then, by analogous reasoning, ﬁrms would forego cost-savings by relocating produc-




















Inequality 18 implies that s
f
i > 0 if (w−γiτiw∗)T˜ a
f





i (w∗) < 0. And given the deﬁnitions of b
f
i (w) and b
f∗
i (w∗) in 11 and
12 above, this implies statements 1 and 2, respectively, of Theorem 1.
Figure 2 illustrates this theorem. If disintegration is possible only at a cost, so
that γ3 > 1, then the relevant hyperplane is A and production remains integrated
13domestically. If it is costless, then γ3 =1and the relevant hyperplane is B in which
case the equilibrium structure of production features disintegration and outsourcing
of fragment 1 in industry 3. Of course, both cases cannot be an equilibrium with the
same domestic factor price line w∗. Theorem 1 is a characterization of equilibrium
disintegration for given levels of γi and τi.T h e e ﬀect of rotating hyperplanes as a
result of globalization scenarios will be considered below. Notice also that there is a
hyperplane for each industry. For fragmentation to become an issue in a given indus-
try, the individual components of value-added must exhibit diﬀerent factor intensities.
These deﬁne a cone which is separated by the hyperplane of Theorem 1. If for this
cone has zero measure, then no such separation can arise in that industry.
4 International disintegration of production
Assume, in line with the general argument outlined in the introduction, that techno-
logical advances and lower trade and communication barriers reduce γi,t h u sc a u s i n g
rotations in the margins of disintegration. In this section, we ﬁr s tl o o ka tw h a td e t e r -
mines the size of this shock for an individual industry, and then characterize possible
ways to restore conditions of equilibrium with increased disintegration. In the sub-
sequent section we emphasize that such “shocks” are likely to arise simultaneously
in several industries, and we look at the factor price eﬀects in a general equilibrium
adjustment.
4.1 Disturbance of the integrated production equilibrium
To be able to focus on a single fragment, we now stipulate that the cost of disintegration
is speciﬁct ot h ef r a g m e n ti n v o l v e d .T ob em o r ec o n c r e t e ,s u p p o s et h a tf o rt h ei n i t i a l
costs of disintegration γ
f
i0 a subset Gi of fragments is produced domestically, while the


























i0) > 0 for f ∈ Hi, (20)
where s
f
i is deﬁn e di n1 6a b o v e ,a n dw h e r ew en o wm a k ee x p l i c i tt h er o l ep l a y e db y
the costs of disintegration. Since we assume constant foreign factor prices throughout
this analysis, we abstain from indexing w∗. It should be noted that eﬀective prices in
an equilibrium with outsourcing also depend on foreign factor prices, and on the cost




i (w0,w ∗,γi0),w h e r eγi0 must
now be thought of as a vector representation of individual elements γ
f
i0. Notice again
the unit convention implying q
f
i0 =1 .13
Suppose, then, that a fall in the costs of locational disintegration of production
rotates the margin of disintegration for some industry from a position like A to a
position like B in ﬁgure 2.14 More speciﬁcally, assume that the hyperplane deﬁned
by theorem 1 crosses the vector b
g
i(w) for some fragment g ∈ Gi which may thus be
secured more cheaply from abroad. In other words, for initial costs of fragmentation
γ
g
i0, savings from outsourcing, s
g







i > 0. We shall henceforth call this a “globalization shock”. Notice that this need not
be the ﬁrst fragment to be disintegrated from domestic industry i value-added. In any
case, we carry out a “marginal” analysis of globalization in that we focus on a single
fragment (in our case fragment g)t h a ti sa ﬀected by this shock.
It is easy to see that this kind of globalization shock implies a violation of the zero

















0,γi1) > 0. (21)
While condition 19 states that foreign production of fragment g ∈ Gi was a loss-making
activity at initial costs of disintegration (and did therefore not take place), equation 21
states that it now generates a positive proﬁt .T h eu n i tc o s to fp r o d u c i n gf r a g m e n tg
abroad, including the cost of locational disintegration, is lower than the value imputed
to that fragment in the initial equilibrium. Thus, at initial factor prices, the zero-proﬁt
condition is violated which generates an incentive for further disintegration of produc-
tion. For a zero-proﬁt equilibrium to be restored, there has to be some adjustment in
factor prices.
Before we turn to the question of what, precisely, this adjustment may look like,
we investigate the magnitude of the disturbance as such. Intuitively, it depends on
the remaining cost of fragmentation after the globalization shock, on the Ricardian
13To avoid clutter, I abstain from indexing g although in a general scenario diﬀerent fragments will
be aﬀected in diﬀerent industries.
14In our modeling framework, the exogenous forces determining the margin are γi and τi.O f
course, the margin also changes if there is a change in factor prices, brought about, say, through
changing prices of ﬁnal goods pi. However, our purpose here is to explore implications of an increased
international disintegration of production on factor prices at constant ﬁnal goods prices. Hence, we
must treat γi and τi as exogenous, and factor prices as endogenous variables.
15productivity diﬀerence between the two economies, and on factor price diﬀerences in
conjunction with the factor intensity pattern in fragment g. This is substantiated in
precise terms in the following theorem.





i) from negative to positive, with certain levels
of the costs of disintegration and Ricardian technology gaps, γi and τi, respectively.
Suppose that in relative terms the initial factor price diﬀerence for factor m is given by
ˆ wm0 = w∗
m/wm0 −1, and represented in vector form by ˆ w. Then, if technology is of the
Leontief-type, at initial factor prices there is a disturbance of the zero-proﬁt equilibrium
in industry i, the magnitude of which — relative to the initial domestic cost of producing
fragment g —i s
σ
g









i is a vector representation of the usual factor shares for fragment g.F o r a
technology which allows for factor substitution, σ
g
i is increased by a further additive
term.
Recognizing equation 21 above, the proof is completed in the appendix. The intuition
is quite straightforward. The costs of disintegrating production and the Ricardian
technology gaps drive the magnitude of the disturbance in a completely symmetric
way. If factors in the foreign economy are less productive, then γiτi > 1,a n dt h eﬁrst
term in σ
g
i is negative. For σ
g
i to be positive, this needs to be oﬀset by a Heckscher-
Ohlin-type advantage arising from the interaction between factor price diﬀerences and
factor intensities, as represented by the second term in Theorem 2.
4.2 Possible adjustments
If the cost of disintegrating production falls such that further international fragmenta-
tion becomes attractive, then some factor prices must increase, reﬂecting the beneﬁt
of an improved technology. In general, such an increase may take place abroad or at
home, or in both economies. A full treatment of this question would require a model
w h e r ef o r e i g nf a c t o rp r i c e sa r ee n d o g e n o u s . H e r ew el o o ka tt h ec a s ew h e r ef o r e i g n
factor prices are given and constant. But even in this simpler case, much can happen.
In particular, domestic factors may gain quite disproportionately. Indeed, it cannot be
ruled out that some factors suﬀer a real income loss.
It should be noticed that simple reference to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does
not suﬃce to establish this case since lower γ’s imply some form of lower cost at
16unchanged commodity prices. In contrast, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is based
on goods price changes at unchanged technology. More importantly, if lower γ’s lead
to outsourcing, then there is a potentially dramatic change in the technology used to
generate domestic value-added which, in turn, seems to preclude a direct application
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to the problem of outsourcing. However, the notion
of eﬀective prices for fragments allows us to frame outsourcing scenarios in such a way
that one can still draw on the fundamental logic of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in
order to identify their factor price eﬀects.
Speciﬁcally, the factor price adjustments following an “outsourcing disturbance” of
the type described above can be analyzed by asking how it changes eﬀective fragment
prices, and by mapping these fragment price changes into factor price changes. The
principal complication is that we are looking at fragments of a value-added chain, rather
than well-deﬁned goods. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem relies on the assumption that
each good is produced with a well-deﬁned pattern of factor inputs which follows from
cost-minimization and depends only on factor prices. The following deﬁnition captures
this basic notion, such that the subsequent analysis can be framed in terms of the
familiar Stolper-Samuelson logic.
Deﬁnition 2 (Stolper-Samuelson-type disturbance) A Stolper-Samuelson distur-
bance is deﬁned as any change in the economic environment which alters the market
value of a single activity with a well-deﬁned and unique pattern of primary factor inputs
per unit of this activity, whereby these inputs depend only on prevailing factor prices.
From 19 and 20 plus the underlying deﬁnitions of eﬀective prices and the zero-proﬁt





i0 =1 . (22)
It may appear puzzling that the sum of eﬀective fragment prices should always add up
to one in the initial equilibrium. One expects, for instance, that a lower ﬁnal goods
price pi, or a lower productivity level, should be reﬂe c t e di nal o w e rl e v e lo fe ﬀective
prices, while 22 states that eﬀective prices always lie on a “unit-plane”. The puzzle is
easily resolved by observing the unit convention behind eﬀective prices in deﬁnition 1
above. Speciﬁcally, lower eﬀective prices for given “natural” units of fragments show
up as a change in units considered, with the eﬀective price π
f
i n o wr e l a t i n gt oal a r g e r















17noting again that q
f







the total factor cost of obtaining “foreign fragments” as required per unit-value of the
ﬁnal good in the initial equilibrium, inclusive of the costs of disintegration.
To proceed with the analysis, we introduce a further deﬁnition of prices relating
to fragments. Thus, for those fragments initially produced at home (f ∈ Gi), we
deﬁne ¯ π
f
i as the input prices “mandated” by ˜ H, irrespective of whether they satisfy





i =1− ˜ H. (24)
One can interpret alternative points on the plane 24 as hypothetical prices for fragments
(as opposed to factor inputs) which would allow ﬁrms to secure the initial levels of
fragment inputs q
f
i0 =1(for f ∈ Gi) at the same total cost. In the initial equilibrium,
this cost is equal to what is left from a dollar’s worth of revenue, after paying the cost
of fragments already outsourced to the foreign economy.
Figure 3 looks at the case where, prior to the globalization scenario, the number of
fragments in Gi has already been cut down to 2, say fragments 1 and 2, with g =2 .
The initial equilibrium {π1
i0,π2
i0} must obviously lie on the straight line 24. Other
points on this line would facilitate the same input cost if fragments did, indeed become
available at the respective prices. However, if all fragments in Gi a r et ob ep r o d u c e d
domestically, then other points on this line would, in general, require domestic factor
prices diﬀerent from w0.15 This is necessarily true if the number of factors is equal to,
or larger than the number of fragments in Gi,a n di ff r a g m e n t sh a v ed i ﬀerent factor
intensities. In this case, the equilibrium factor price vector w0 uniquely determines the
eﬀective prices consistent with zero proﬁts in domestic production of fragments f ∈ Gi.
If the number of factors is smaller than the number of fragments in Gi, then equilibrium
factor prices w0 would allow for some degree of freedom as regards eﬀective prices of
fragments in Gi, but except for a coincidence the set of eﬀective prices consistent with
w0 would not lie on the line 24.16
15Notice the diﬀerence between prices ¯ π
f
i and eﬀective prices according to deﬁnition 1 above. 24
only looks at the “upper level” technology of assembling fragments to ﬁnal goods, whereas deﬁnition
1 is also concerned with the production of fragments on the “lower level” of technology.
16To see this, take the simplest case with only one factor and two fragments. If the input-coeﬃcients
for the two fragments are diﬀerent, then the fragment price-line consistent with zero proﬁts has a slope
diﬀerent from one and, thus, does not coincide with the straight line 24.
18To proceed with the analysis, I now assume that technology features functional
separability in the sense that the two components 1 and 2 can be aggregated to a
composite input G according to a concave aggregator qG
i (q1
i,q2
i).17 This implies that




i ) which is concave in prices ¯ π.G i v e n a l l
fragments are scaled such that q
f
i0 =1 , the initial level of this composite input is equal
to qG
i (1,1). The initial equilibrium point {π1
i0,π2
i0} must lie on the “fragment price









i (1,1)] = 1 − ˜ H. (25)
Suppose now that fragments do become available at prices diﬀerent from their
initial equilibrium levels {π1
i0,π2
i0}. After all, this is what outsourcing is all about.
Disregarding the implications for domestic factor prices for a moment, other input
prices for fragments imply that q1
i =1and q2
i =1is no longer optimal if technology
allows for substitution among fragments. Conversely, if q1
i0 =1=q2
i0 is optimal, then
the fragment price frontier 25 must be tangent to the line 24 at the equilibrium point
{π1
i0,π2
i0}, implying that Shephard’s lemma indeed leads to q1
i0 =1=q2
i0.
If fragment 2 is now outsourced, with a savings eﬀect as described by theorem 2
above, then the input price for this fragment is reduced by σ2
i in proportional terms,
and by σ2
i × π2




i) is of the Leontief-type, then the fragment price frontier 25
coincides with the line 24, and the ensuing adjustment must entail a relative change
in the eﬀective price of fragment 1 equal to σ2
i × π2
i0/π1
i0. If technology allows for
substitution between fragments 1 and 2, then the fragment price frontier is strictly
convex, and the “mandated” increase of the eﬀective price of fragment 1 exceeds σ2
i×π2
i0,
moving to point P1 on the fragment price frontier in ﬁgure 3. Of course, this does
not complete the adjustment story, even from a partial equilibrium point of view.
First, in ﬁgure 3 we realize from the steeper slope of the fragment price frontier at
P1 that adjustment involves a substitution away from fragment 1 towards fragment 2.
Secondly, and more importantly, the higher eﬀective price of fragment 1 implied by this
adjustment must also be supported by factor prices diﬀerent from w0. In other words,
a higher “mandated” eﬀective price for domestic fragment 1 in turn “mandates” higher
domestic factor prices.
I nt h es i m p l ec a s eo fﬁgure 3, the vertical distance between points P0 and P1 is a
17On this form of separability, see Varian (1992, pp. 150-152).
19measure of the overall domestic factor price increase that is ”mandated” by the lower
cost of locational disintegration and the attendant outsourcing of fragment 2. We shall
henceforth call this the “industry gain from outsourcing”, and we use σ1
i to indicate
this gain relative to the initial eﬀective price of fragment 1 (which remains domestic).
As far as industry i alone is concerned the precise distribution of this overall gain across
diﬀerent factor owners is indeterminate, unless there is only one factor. A proportional
increase in all factor rewards equal to the industry gain is a possible, but not the only
outcome. The distributional eﬀect of outsourcing can only be determined by general
equilibrium considerations to which we shall turn in the next section.
It is important for what follows that the industry gain σ1
i is a Stolper-Samuelson
disturbance, since π1
i0(1+σ1
i) must be seen as the post-outsourcing market value of frag-
ment 1 which is, by deﬁnition, characterized by a well deﬁned pattern of primary factor
inputs in the sense of deﬁnition 2. It is relatively easy to generalize this result to the
case where more than one component of the value-added chain remain in the domestic
economy. What we need is an extension of the above separability assumption. Thus, if
functional separability gives rise to an eﬀective fragment price frontier for all fragments
in Gi, and if the fragments remaining in the post-outsourcing domestic value-added
chain are in the same sense separable from component g which is outsourced, then
the generalization is straightforward. We shall henceforth call this composite activity
residual value-added and indicate it with ¯ G.18 A perfectly analogous generalization is
possible with Hicksian aggregation instead of functional separability. This case arises if
all fragments of the post-outsourcing domestic value-added chain have constant relative
eﬀective prices.19 The diﬀerent fragments of domestic value-added will then be used in
constant proportions which, in turn, implies that the value-added process as a whole is
characterized by a unique pattern of primary factor inputs depending on factor prices.
T h ea b o v el i n eo fa r g u m e n tt h u sl e a d st ot h ef o l l o w i n gt h e o r e m .
Theorem 3 (Stolper-Samuelson disturbance) A “globalization shock” of the kind
underlying Theorem 2 generates a Stolper-Samuelson disturbance for the domestic in-
dustry i,
1. if foreign factor prices w∗ are constant,
18To avoid cluttered notation, I abstain from indexing ¯ G although this set will be diﬀerent across
industries, as is the speciﬁc fragment g aﬀected by outsourcing.
19This raises an issue of interpretation which I cannot address here. A possible interpretation is
that there are perfect markets for fragments f ∈ ¯ Gi where industry i ﬁrms of negligible importance.
202. if the fragments in Gi are functionally separable form those in Hi,a n d
3. if the fragments that remain in the domestic value-added chain constitute an
integrated economic activity in the sense of functional separability, or by virtue
of constant relative eﬀective fragment prices.
In proportional terms, the market value of this residual domestic value-added, indicated












i0, respectively, are initial equilib-
rium eﬀective prices for activities g and ¯ G in industry i value-added. In turn, σ
¯ G
i is an
overall measure of the extent to which the “industry-i-gain” from outsourcing mandates
an increase in domestic factor prices.
It is important to note that with a given savings eﬀect related to fragment g,t h e
magnitude of the industry-gain σ
¯ G





which is equal to the initial cost of fragment g relative to the total cost of the residual
domestic value-added-chain. A relatively small share of residual value-added relative
to the fragment which is outsourced thus acts as a leverage for the magnitude of the
Stolper-Samuelson disturbance.
5 General equilibrium: distributional eﬀects
From a partial equilibrium perspective, the distribution of the industry gain σ
¯ G
i across
factors is indeterminate. To identify distributional eﬀects of outsourcing, we need to
look at the whole economy. Much depends on the number of factors involved and
whether they are mobile across sectors or speciﬁc to industries. We retain the assump-
tion of an arbitrary number of factors with perfect intersectoral mobility. We allow
outsourcing to take place simultaneously in several industries, assuming that in each
industry it gives rise to a Stolper-Samuelson disturbance as described in the previous
section. The crucial point to bear in mind is that the industry-i-gain from outsourcing
reﬂe c t sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ev a l u eo fa na c t i v i t yw i t haw e l ld e ﬁned factor input pat-
tern which depends on domestic factor prices. This implies, in turn, that factor price
changes have a well deﬁned eﬀect on the cost of this activity. If the activity is to remain
viable, then factor price changes must be such that the implied increase in this cost is
equal to the industry gain σ
¯ G
i . This must hold for all activities in the economy. How-
ever, simply invoking all relevant zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n si sn o ts u ﬃcient to determine
factor price changes. We need to broaden our perspective to full general equilibrium,
including factor market clearing conditions.
215.1 Some factors may suﬀer a real income loss
The general line of reasoning is best understood by looking at ﬁgure 4 which refers
to ﬁgures 1 and 2 above in assuming that the initial equilibrium features domestic
s p e c i a l i z a t i o no ni n d u s t r i e s2a n d3 ,w i t hn oi nternational disintegration of produc-
tion. We now assume that this equilibrium is disturbed by lower costs of international
fragmentation. For simplicity, we ﬁrst look at the case where outsourcing is restricted
to industry 2. The more general case will be dealt with below. The unit-value iso-
quants for ﬁnal goods 2 and 3 are tangent to the initial factor price line w0.S o a r e
the industry-2-isoquants corresponding to the unit-value levels of fragment 1 and the




20, The assumption thus is that a shift in the margin of disintegration will lead
to outsourcing of fragment 1 in industry 2.
Referring to the analysis in the previous section, we can now identify the factor
price eﬀects from this type of outsourcing by shifting the unit-value isoquant for the









2 ). The size of σ
¯ G
2 is determined as described in theorem 2 above.
Integrated production of good 2 is no longer viable domestically, nor is fragment 1 of
industry 2. Only the remaining part of the value-added-chain (activity ¯ G)r e m a i n s
viable. Capital suﬀers an income loss, while labor gains. If ﬁnal goods prices remain
constant as assumed, then these are also real income changes. This corresponds to the
case considered by Arndt (1997, 1999).
It is fairly obvious, however, that this case does not establish a general result.
Assume, for instance that the residual factor intensity ray b
¯ G
2 lies to the south-east of
a3 (not depicted, to avoid clutter). In that case international fragmentation, while still
aﬀecting the labor intensive of the two industries, increases the imputed value of an
activity which is relatively capital intensive, and the same logic leads to a real income
loss (gain) for labor (capital). But this is consistent with a full employment equilibrium
only if the domestic endowment ray similarly lies to the south-east of a3,s u c ha sV 0
instead of V . Indeed, it can be shown using ﬁgure 4 that the two cases are mutually
exclusive, and factor endowments determine which case is ruled out. A full analysis
thus requires looking at domestic factor endowments and factor market clearing. A
ﬁrst result is easily derived from ﬁgure 4.
Theorem 4 (real income loss) If outsourcing is driven by factor intensity diﬀer-
ences across fragments (as described by Theorem 2), and if it takes place only in in-
dustry i, then, with given domestic endowments and perfect ﬂexibility of factor prices,





i0 = eV ,w h e r ee is a positive scalar and V is the domestic endowment
vector. If b
¯ G
i0 = eV , then all activities except b
¯ G
i0 become nonviable economically, and
all factor prices rise by the same proportional amount σ
¯ G
i .
The proof is straightforward. Full employment of factor endowments requires that V
lies in a cone spanned by the factor-input rays of all viable activities. In ﬁgure 4, the
relevant cone prior to outsourcing is spanned by a20 and a30, and with international
fragmentation it is spanned by b
¯ G
21 and a31, respectively. If b
¯ G
i0 6= eV , then full em-
ployment requires that some other activity remains viable, in addition to the residual
value-added-chain of industry 2. Given constant ﬁnal goods prices, this in turn requires
constant unit-cost for some other activity which, by construction of our argument, does
not itself beneﬁt from outsourcing. Thus, the familiar Stolper-Samuelson logic applies:
the industry-i-gain σ
¯ G
i requires that some factor prices increase (labor in ﬁgure 4),
while the viability constraint on some other activity requires that at least one factor
price declines (capital rental in ﬁgure 4).20 With constant ﬁnal goods prices, these are
also real income changes.
5.2 A general result on distributional consequences
Theorem 4 is obviously an extreme case with rather limited empirical relevance. How-
ever, it is a useful step towards a more general result on distributional consequences of
outsourcing. Thus, let us assume that international fragmentation aﬀects several in-
dustries at the same time. The industry-speciﬁc features of the shock are summarized
by certain magnitudes of the industry-gains σ
¯ G
i , and by the technology pertaining to
the residual value-added-chains. These technologies are captured by the factor input
bundles a
¯ G
i (w) or, equivalently, by the unit-value levels of these bundles which are de-
ﬁned as in 11. Remember that we have employed a simple scaling assumption such







f∈ ¯ Gi ˜ a
f
i (w0) where a tilde indicates inputs per unit of a fragment.
Invoking the separability assumption underlying theorem 3 above, we now use ˜ a
¯ G
i (w)
to denote the cost-minimizing input bundle per unit of the aggregate residual activity
20In ﬁgure 4, a case where b
¯ G
i0 = eV cannot arise because ﬁnal good 3 is the only activity remaining
besides b
¯ G
i0. But in the more general case where several further activities are present, such a case is
easily conceivable.





We now introduce factor market clearing by means of the dual GNP function.21 Due







TV | ci(w)/pi ≥ 1 for all i
ª
. (26)
Allowing for international disintegration of production, the minimum cost functions in
26 need to be replaced by appropriate expressions pertaining to individual fragments
(see 2 above), duly taking into account foreign factor prices w∗, which in this case
become a further determinant of domestic GNP, as do the costs of international frag-
mentation γi. Thus, in the initial equilibrium factor prices w0 satisfy the inequality
constraint postulated by 26 in the speciﬁc form of expressions 19 and 20 above, with
γi = γi0. These conditions state that the minimum cost of each fragment, wherever
it is produced, is equal to its imputed market value, with the inequalities ruling out
further cost reductions by relocating production of individual fragments. At this stage
it becomes relevant whether the real resources used through the cost of international
fragmentation are domestic or foreign resources. The way we model these costs implies
that they involve foreign, not domestic, factor use. This is not a crucial element for
the result to be derived below.
We now turn to a scenario of further disintegration of production, brought about
by lower costs of disintegrating production, γi1 ≤ γi0.22 In the above analysis, we
h a v ei n d i c a t e dt h ef r a g m e n tw h i c hw i l lb er e l o c a t e da b r o a db yg.W em u s tn o w a d d
that in the initial equilibrium a condition analogous to 19 implicitly also holds for
the composite residual activity ¯ G in each industry i which is active in the domestic
economy. Denoting the imputed value of that residual activity by π
¯ G









Lower costs of disintegration now change these market values, leading to Stolper-
Samuelson disturbances in several (in the extreme case: all) industries. Indicating
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i ) for all i
o
. (28)
21See Dixit & Norman (1980, pp. 44 ﬀ.) for a more detailed treatment of the dual GNP function.
22Notice that γi is a vector representation of industry-speciﬁc costs of international fragmentation.
24The new factor prices w1 must satisfy this minimization exercise. The question now
is how we may describe the diﬀerence between w1 and w0 in a general and interesting
way. Remember that the industry gain σ
¯ G
i is a summary measure of the factor price
increase “mandated” the cost-savings from outsourcing in industry i.S u p p o s e n o w
that this gain varies across industries and industry i0 is the one industry where the
gain is at least as large as in all the others. We shall henceforth call industry i0 the
“leading industry”.
For benchmark purposes, we deﬁne a notional factor price vector
w
0




1 would prevail in the new equilibrium if all industries were to enjoy
industry-gains equal to σ
¯ G
i0. Since unit-input-demands are homogeneous of degree zero,
and given equation 27, factor prices w0
1 satisfy the constraint in 28. Hence, by deﬁnition




T V ≤ 0, (30)
with a strict inequality if industry-gains are diﬀerent, and if more than one domestic




















ϕm0 ≥ 1, (31)
where ϕm1 =( wm1Vm)/Y1, i.e., the share of factor m in post-outsourcing-GNP, and
accordingly for ϕm0. The second inequality follows from the simple adding-up property
of ϕm1, i.e.,
PM
m=1 ϕm1 =1 .T h et e r mY0(1 + σ
¯ G
i0)/Y1 may be interpreted as a scaling
factor representing the benchmark case of equal industry-gains σ
¯ G
i0. N o t i c et h a ti n
this special case Y1 = Y0(1 + σ
¯ G
i0), hence 31 holds with equality and income shares do
not change. In the more general case, inequality 31 mirrors the fact that an equal
percentage increase of all factor remunerations by the maximum industry-gain σ
¯ G
i0 is
beyond what outsourcing oﬀers in terms of economy-wide cost-savings.
Deﬁnition 3 (distributional impact measure) We deﬁne ∆ϕm = ϕm1−ϕm0[Y0(1+
σ
¯ G
i0)/Y1] and ωm =( wm1 − w0
m1)/wm0 as measures of the distributional impact that
outsourcing has on factor m. Depending on whether these measures are positive or
negative, we may say that factor m gains more than, or less than, proportionally from
outsourcing. ω is a vector representation of ωm.
25Notice that ∆ϕm > 0 if and only if ωm > 0, and analogously for ∆ϕm < 0.I ti si m -
p o r t a n tt h a tw ea r en o tc h a r a c t e r i z i n gt he distributional impact by actual diﬀerences
between equilibria, because such diﬀerences would also reﬂect the overall gain accruing
to the economy from lower costs of fragmentation. Instead, we are taking the hypo-
thetical case of a uniform gain equal to σ
¯ G
i0 as a benchmark to identify distributional
consequences.
From our reasoning with ﬁgure 4, we expect that the factor price eﬀect of outsourc-
ing is importantly determined by the factor intensity characteristics of outsourcing. We
now apply a revealed-cost-minimization argument to the residual activity of the “lead-
ing industry” i0. Remember that ˜ a
¯ G
i0(w) is an input bundle for the initial quantity-level
of the residual value-added-chain which, by suitable scaling, was set equal to one. We
now look at the input bundle for a larger quantity 1/π
¯ G
i0 which represents a value of




Deﬁnition 4 (factor intensity measure) We deﬁne θm = wm0˜ b
¯ G
i0m(w0) − ϕm0 as a
summary measure of the factor-intensity characteristics of outsourcing. θ is a vector
representation of θm.
This variable measures the extent to which a factor’s share in the residual value-added-




i0(w0)=1 ;s e e2 7a b o v e . H e n c e
PM
m=1 θm =0 . N o t i c et h a tw e
characterize the factor-intensity characteristics not by looking at the fragment which
leaves the country, but instead at the residual domestic value-added-chain.














In the new equilibrium, cost-minimizing ﬁrms will employ an input bundle ˜ b
¯ G
i0(w1) to
generate a certain level of the aggregate fragment ¯ G which was initially imputed a value
of one, and which now has an imputed value equal to 1+σ
¯ G
i0.Z e r op r o ﬁts, therefore,
imply that the cost incurred for this level of fragment ¯ G is also equal to 1+σ
¯ G
i0.U n d e r
the initial factor prices w0, cost-minimizing ﬁrms would have used the bundle ˜ b
¯ G
i0(w0)




i0(w1) which, by deﬁnition is the best ﬁrms can do; hence the inequality
i nt h es e c o n dp a r to f3 2 .A tt h es a m et i m e ,i ft h ec o s to f˜ b
¯ G
i0(w0) was equal to one at
initial factor prices w0, as argued above, then using the bundle ˜ b
¯ G
i0(w1) would have









i0(w1) ≥ 1. (33)










i0(w0) ≥ 0 (34)
Multiplying this by 1+σ
¯ G





0. Combining this with inequality 30, where we may expand each term by wm0/wm0
and divide by Y0, we arrive at Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 (distributional impact of outsourcing) If globalization leads to si-
multaneous shifts in the margins of disintegration for several industries, and if there is
a “leading industry” i0 where the resulting Stolper-Samuelson disturbance for the resid-
ual domestic value-added-chain, σ
¯ G
i0,i sa tl e a s ta sl a r g ea si na n yo t h e ri n d u s t r y ,t h e n
the distributional impact of such a shift is related to the factor-intensity characteristics
of the resulting process of outsourcing in the following way:
ω
Tθ ≥ 0. (35)
Given that
PM
m=1 θm =0 ,a sn o t e da b o v e ,w em a yn o t et h a tt h eb a s i cr e s u l tc a na l s o
be expressed by stating that the correlation coeﬃcient between the two variable ωm
and θm across factors is positive.
5.3 Interpretation
The general message conveyed by theorem 5 is that the distributional consequences of
international fragmentation are not at all determined by the factor-intensity pattern
of those fragments which are outsourced to the foreign economy. Instead, they are
determined by the factor intensity of the activities that remain economically viable
in the domestic economy. Which of the activities remains viable domestically is, in
turn, determined by the intersectoral pattern of the Stolper-Samuelson disturbances
that arise in the process of outsourcing.
It is, of course, conceivable that activities which were formerly viable at home
become unproﬁtable as factor prices change, even though they are not directly hit by
changes in the cost of international fragmentation. Indeed, in the case where we have
several industries and only two primary factors, such “extreme specialization eﬀects”
are almost inevitable. This is a well-known property of Heckscher-Ohlin models which
27— unsurprisingly — reappears in the present context of international fragmentation. The
smaller the discrepancy between the number of ﬁnal goods (or industries) and primary
factors, the less likely are such dimensionality of factor space and ﬁnal goods space.23
It may also be the case that for some industries the margin of disintegration cuts into
the domestic value-added-chain not through a fall in the cost international fragmenta-
tion, but through the factor price eﬀect stemming from Stolper-Samuelson disturbances
in other industries. This case is covered by the above result on the same grounds as
the case where whole value-added-chains (rather than individual fragments) become
nonviable. The crucial point is that in both cases the inequality constraint in 28 may
be used a fortiori for those activities that become nonviable through the factor price
change from w0 to w1. The same does not hold true, however, for activities which were
nonviable at initial factor prices and which become viable at w1. In theory, this case
may even arise in such a way that individual fragments which were formerly produced
abroad re-enter the domestic value-added-chain. This process of reverse outsourcing is
not covered by the above result.
It should be interesting to see if special cases discussed in the previous literature
can be reconstructed from Theorem 5 above under appropriate assumptions. This can
be done, for instance, for the seemingly contradictory results emphasized by Arndt
(1997 and 1999) and Feenstra & Hanson (1996 and 1997). Both are special in diﬀerent
ways and can be stated as corollaries of Theorem 5.
Corollary 1 If there are only two industries and factors (capital K and labor L,s a y ) ,
if outsourcing takes place only in the labor-intensive industry, and if both industries
remain viable, then it will be true that θL > 0 and θK < 0, and hence that ωL > 0 and
ωK > 0.
This is the case stressed by Arndt. The inequalities θL > 0 and θK < 0 follow from
the above mentioned requirement that the two activities must span a cone containing
the endowment point.
Corollary 2 If there is only one industry drawing on many fragments with diﬀering
factor-intensities (say skilled labor S relative to unskilled labor U), and if for some
reason it is always the most skill-intensive fragment that is outsourced to the foreign
e c o n o m y ,t h e ni tw i l la l w a y sb et r u et h a tθS > 0 and θU < 0, and hence that ωS > 0
and ωU > 0.
23See Ethier (1984).
28This is the case which, by virtue of their model assumptions, emerges in Feenstra &
Hanson. The reason for θS > 0 and θU < 0 is as with the previous corollary.
Corollaries 1 and 2 involve cases which are especially interesting to look at since
they use Theorem 5 for a reconstruction of results that have been discussed in previous
literature and which seem contradictory at ﬁrst sight. Other cases for which this could
be done are found.in Jones (2000) and Jones & Kierzkowski (2001b), but available
space does not permit any further discussion in this paper.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Instead of reiterating results, I conclude the paper with a few suggestions for further
research. There are obvious and less obvious avenues. The assumption of given world
prices for ﬁnal goods is an obvious candidate for relaxation. The analysis in this paper
has looked at outsourcing from a single country perspective, even assuming constant
prices in foreign factor markets that outsourcing draws upon. A distinct “ﬂavor of
smallness” is thus present in the analysis. If international fragmentation is instead
seen as a large scale and world-wide reorganization of vertical production structures,
then it is likely to change equilibrium world prices for ﬁnal goods and thus factor prices
in all countries. Scenarios of this kind can only be addressed with the aid of a model
where world prices are endogenous.
However, even for cases where world prices of ﬁnal goods are exogenous and con-
stant, assuming constant foreign factor prices may be unwarranted for speciﬁc scenarios
of outsourcing. Under the assumption of constant foreign factor prices, outsourcing ba-
sically introduces a new productive activity into the foreign economy with an imputed
value which is equal to its factor cost at the prices prevailing in foreign factor markets.
All cost-savings that arise from a geographical restructuring of production are imputed
to higher eﬀective prices of residual domestic value-added-chains. This is a reasonable
assumption if domestic ﬁrms have some form of ownership advantage, and if the resid-
ual domestic value-added is a “downstream” activity which needs to be carried out in
the domestic economy, say because of some national advantage, such as a speciﬁcf o r m
of infrastructure.
In other cases, however, conditions may be such that the fragment which is now
produced abroad achieves an imputed value which is equal to its former cost of pro-
duction at factor prices prevailing in the domestic economy. Then, the activity which
newly emerges in the foreign economy has an eﬀective (or imputed) price in excess of
its foreign factor cost. In this case, equilibrium adjustment requires some foreign factor
29price change which may be determined along the lines of the above analysis. Further
research should specify the precise conditions under which either of these cases is likely
to arise.
These conditions most likely also relate to the costs that arise if production is
fragmented across national borders. As argued in the introduction, the analysis in this
paper has deliberately chosen a somewhat rudimentary treatment of these costs, so as
to allow a sharp focus in the channels relevant for factor price changes. A richer model
structure would allow for asymmetries between fragments as regards the cost involved
if production is disintegrated. In a similar vein, introducing an explicit “upstream-
downstream” dimension into the underlying technology of fragmentation would help
to generate sharper results.
A ﬁnal point relates to the assumption of perfect competition and — related to this
— the complete absence of any element of ﬁxed costs. Imperfect competition may be
relevant on goods markets and, maybe more interestingly, on labor markets which
are often the key concern in connection with outsourcing.24 In turn, ﬁxed costs, may
be relevant in production proper, or in bridging locational and cultural diﬀerences if
production takes place under international fragmentation.
It is to be expected that the framework of analysis presented in this paper forms a
useful ground for exploring several of these avenues for further research. A key message
from this framework is that the consequences of international fragmentation are best
understood as arising from changes in eﬀective prices for fragments of the value-added-
chain. These vary across industries and the general equilibrium eﬀects of outsourcing
depends on where these changes are particularly large, and on the technological details
of the marginal fragments aﬀected. The above analysis has opened up ways to pin
down the relevant properties in terms of general statements which should prove useful
for further research.
24See, for instance, Skaksen (2001) where outsourcing takes place under a unionized labor market.
30A p p e n d i x :P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2
We ﬁrst recognize 21, and then decompose the cost-savings achieved by disintegrat-






























































i > 0 implies that the margin of disintegration in Theorem 1 has crossed
b
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i are vector representations of the usual factor shares for fragment g.







i(w0)], and analogously for
θ
g∗
im. Moreover, ˆ w0 is a vector of factor price diﬀerences between the foreign and domestic
economy, expressed in relative terms, such that for factor m, ˆ wm0 = w∗
m0/wm0−1. And
the ﬁnally, the term ˆ a0
i measures the eﬃciency-corrected diﬀerence in inputs between






im(w∗)]−1. If technology of
fragment g is of the Leontief-type, featuring ﬁxed input coeﬃcients for all factors, we
have ˆ a
g
im =0 , which leads to Theorem 2. For a technology allowing for factor substitu-
tion, the ﬁnal term in this equation is always positive by virtue of cost-minimization.
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Figure 1: Pre-fragmentation trading equilibrium 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium under fragmentation 
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      Figure 3: Industry gain from outsourcing 
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      Figure 4: General equilibrium effect of outsourcing on domestic factor prices 
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